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We study the relation between analysts’ target price revisions and recent market returns, 
excess stock returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. Empirical results show 
that, after controlling for earnings forecast and recommendation revisions, target price 
revisions are associated with each of these information sources. We also find that target 
price revisions are more sensitive to negative than to positive excess stock returns. We 
conjecture that firms’ tendency to withhold bad news, while releasing good news 
promptly, drives this effect and, using proxies for firms’ withholding of bad news, we 
report evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Analysts’ target prices provide a simple information signal that is incrementally 
informative to investors beyond earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Brav and 
Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Da and Schaumburg, 2011; Bilinski et al. 2013). 
Nevertheless, research on target prices, and therefore our understanding of them, falls 
significantly short of the body of research on analysts’ earnings forecasts (e.g., Bradshaw, 
2011). In this study we explore the relation between analysts’ target price revisions and 
the information in market returns, firm-specific returns, and other analyst forecasts. As 
private communication with managers is important for analysts (Brown et al., 2015) and 
managers have a general tendency to withhold bad news (Kothari et al., 2009), we are 
particularly interested in how the difference between bad and good news conditions this 
relation. 
We examine analysts’ target price revisions for 1,104 stocks listed in the UK between 
January 2003 and December 2014. The UK offers a fertile setting for examining analysts’ 
target prices for several reasons. First, based on Bilinski et al.’s (2013) statistics, the UK 
has the second largest sample of analysts’ target price forecasts after the U.S., and the 
accuracy of target prices is slightly better in the UK than in the U.S. (see also Bradshaw 
et al., 2014). The properties of UK target prices, however, are relatively under-researched. 
Second, UK analysts should have strong incentives to provide high quality information 
to institutional investors, counterbalancing their incentives to please the companies they 
follow.1 Third, the availability of a unique UK corporate disclosure index gives us a 
valuable proxy for the relative tendencies of UK firms to withhold bad news. 
                                               
1 Brown et al. (2015) suggest that most analysts focus on meeting the demands of large institutional 
investors rather than those of small, individual investors. Bilinski et al. (2015) find that analysts strategically 
bias their target prices for stocks associated with high short-term institutional investors and institutional 
investors reward brokers who cater for their needs. Institutional ownership in the UK is higher than in the 
U.S. (Short and Keasey, 1999). We therefore expect UK analysts to pay particular attention to the 
informational needs of UK institutional investors. 
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We find that, after controlling for earnings forecast and recommendation revisions, 
analysts’ target price revisions are significantly associated with market returns, excess 
stock returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. We also find that target price 
revisions are more sensitive to firm-specific bad news than good news in excess stock 
returns, while the sensitivity to other sources of information does not vary across good 
and bad news. Using a new UK disclosure index2 as an information uncertainty proxy, 
we show that the asymmetric sensitivity of target price revisions to positive and negative 
excess stock returns is significant for low disclosure quality firms but insignificant for 
high disclosure quality firms. Using analyst coverage as an alternative information 
uncertainty proxy yields a similar pattern. Since Kothari et al. (2009) suggest that firms 
with higher information uncertainty have more opportunities to withhold bad news, we 
suggest that these findings are consistent with the differential opportunities of firms to 
withhold and accumulate bad news affecting analysts’ target price revisions, although we 
do not rule out alternative explanations.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the first to model the 
relation between target price revisions and the information in market returns, excess stock 
returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. Our model has high explanatory power 
for target price revisions with R-squared values ranging from 52% to 62% for the main 
analysis and analyses of different subsamples. We extend previous studies examining the 
association between earnings forecast revisions and information in stock returns and other 
analysts’ forecasts. We show that after controlling for earnings forecast and 
recommendation revisions, market returns, excess stock returns, and other analysts’ target 
price revisions are incrementally informative for target price revisions. We argue that our 
                                               
2 The disclosure index comes from the Corporate Financial Information Environment (CFIE 2015) Project’s 
web-based annual report scoring tool (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/cfie/). 
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findings are consistent with analysts using additional information about growth and risk 
in stock returns and other analysts’ forecasts, beyond those in earnings forecast and 
recommendation revisions, when they revise their target prices. However, as our findings 
could result from target price revisions, stock returns, other analysts’ forecasts, and 
market returns all responding to the same information source, we acknowledge that the 
association between these variables does not allow us to establish a causal relation.  
A second important contribution of our paper is that we show that firms’ strategic 
disclosure strategies affect analysts’ forecasts. Previous studies find evidence of an 
asymmetric investor reaction to bad and good news and provide conflicting theories for 
the asymmetric reaction. Skinner (1994) attributes the asymmetric reaction to managers’ 
pre-releasing bad news before mandatory earnings announcements, while Kothari et al. 
(2009) view the asymmetric pattern as evidence of managers’ withholding bad news. We 
show that analysts react asymmetrically to the bad and good news in excess stock returns 
when revising their target prices and provide evidence consistent with the withholding 
bad news argument. This is also the first paper to examine the conditioning effect of 
corporate disclosure quality on the relation between target price revisions and news.     
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies and develops our 
main hypotheses. Section 3 presents our research design and discusses econometric 
issues. Section 4 describes the data selection process and presents summary statistics 
while section 5 reports our empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Analysts’ forecasts, stock returns, and other analysts’ forecasts 
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Prior studies show that sell-side analysts incorporate information in stock returns and 
other analysts’ forecasts into their earnings forecast and recommendation revisions (e.g., 
Lys and Sohn, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Conrad et al., 2006; Welch, 2000; Clement et al., 
2011). We extend this literature by examining the sensitivity of target price revisions to 
different information sources. While Clarkson et al. (2013) and Dechow and You (2013) 
examine the factors affecting target prices and implied expected returns, they do not 
examine target price revisions. Examining target price revisions rather than levels allows 
us to examine how analysts use new information to update their forecasts.  
Analysts’ typically derive their target prices from an underlying valuation model 
(e.g., Demirakos et al., 2004). Analyst valuation models normally require as inputs an 
accounting primitive (e.g., future expected earnings, cash flows, dividends) and 
assumptions about growth and risk. Market, industry, and firm-specific factors affect each 
of these inputs. Target price revisions should reflect updated views on these inputs 
between target price revision dates. We also expect market and excess stock returns 
between target price revision dates to reflect this information.3 Between target price 
revision dates, analysts receive news about valuation inputs from direct sources, including 
management, and from secondary sources such as market and excess stock returns.4 They 
also observe the target price revisions of other analysts. Analysts should take news from 
these information sources into account when revising their target prices. Therefore, we 
expect to see positive associations between target price revisions and market returns, 
excess stock returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. We test the following 
hypotheses.  
                                               
3 Both market and excess stock returns should reflect industry news.  
4 While management forecasts are an important source of information for analysts in the U.S., UK 
companies do not routinely provide management forecasts. We therefore do not consider management 
forecasts in our empirical analysis, although we refer to management forecasts below in relation to previous 
research on U.S. companies. 
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H1a: There is a positive association between analysts’ target price revisions and 
recent market returns. 
H1b: There is a positive association between analysts’ target price revisions and 
recent excess stock returns. 
H1c: There is a positive association between analysts’ target price revisions and 
other analysts’ consensus target price revisions.  
Although we expect to see significant associations between the three sources of 
analyst information and target price revisions, it is not possible to conclude that such 
associations imply causality. In all three cases there may be other, unobserved, sources 
of information that cause analysts to revise their target prices, and this information also 
causes stock prices to change and other analysts to revise their target prices. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the strength of the associations we report for these basic relationships and 
the additional analyses we present are worthy of attention. We leave it to future research 
to establish the extent to which the strong correlations we report are causal. 
2.2 Strategic firm disclosures and analysts’ reactions to good and bad news  
Several theoretical models and empirical studies suggest that managers withhold bad 
news. Verrecchia (1983) shows that managers have incentives to withhold bad news when 
there are disclosure costs. Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) show that firms may 
strategically delay disclosing bad news when investors are uncertain whether managers 
have received private information. Pae (2005) shows that when firms receive two news 
signals, they disclose only the favourable signal if it is sufficiently favourable relative to 
the other. Empirical studies support the predictions of these models. Chambers and 
Penman (1984) find that firms are more likely to release positive earnings reports earlier 
than expected and disclose bad news later than expected. Ertimur et al. (2014) find that 
firms are more likely to delay bad news disclosures in lockup expiry quarters to mitigate 
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the adverse effect on stock prices. Ge and Lennox (2011) document that firms tend to 
withhold bad news about future earnings when companies use their own stock to finance 
acquisitions.  
In contrast to the idea that firms withhold bad news, Skinner (1994) argues that 
managers face an asymmetric loss function when disclosing voluntarily before mandatory 
earnings announcements, as negative earnings surprises incur large litigation or 
reputation costs. He finds that stock price reactions to voluntary bad news disclosures are 
stronger than the reactions to voluntary good news disclosures and concludes that this is 
consistent with managers’ accelerating bad news. Other circumstances in which managers 
choose to opportunistically disclose bad news are before option grant dates to 
opportunistically benefit from lower stock prices (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 
2000) and in order to maximise trading profits from insider trading (Cheng and Lo, 2006). 
While these examples provide settings in which managers have incentives to disclose bad 
news, they are not inconsistent with the prior withholding of bad news. For managers to 
have a block of bad news to disclose, they are likely to have accumulated it by 
withholding bad news over time before eventually disclosing it.  
Kothari et al. (2009) find that the magnitude of investors’ reactions to bad news 
announcements such as dividend reductions and pessimistic management forecasts is 
stronger than that to corresponding good news announcements. Kothari et al. argue that 
it is managers’ tendency to withhold bad news, rather than Skinner’s (1994) accelerating 
bad news explanation, that drives the stronger reaction. They suggest that if their results 
are due to managers accelerating bad news but disclosing good news gradually, the 
absolute forecast errors associated with good news management forecasts should be 
higher than those associated with bad news. But they find that the mean absolute forecast 
errors associated with good news are smaller, not higher, than those associated with bad 
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news. Conducting tests to rule out other explanations, Kothari et al. conclude that the 
asymmetric market reaction to bad news is due to managers’ tendency, on average, to 
withhold bad news while releasing good news as they receive it.  
One way that managers release news is by communicating it to analysts. This 
means that if managers leak good news early to analysts, analysts need to rely less on 
indirect sources such as public signals in stock returns and other analysts’ forecasts to 
discover good news.5 In contrast, when managers withhold bad news, analysts have to 
rely more on other information sources, such as stock returns and other analysts’ 
forecasts, to discover the bad news. As both excess stock returns and other analyst’ 
consensus target price revisions reflect firm-specific news, we predict that the positive 
associations between analysts’ target price revisions and excess stock returns and other 
analysts’ consensus target price revisions are stronger when the firm-specific news is bad. 
Using negative excess stock returns as an indicator of firm-specific bad news, this leads 
to the following hypotheses. 
H2a: The positive association between target price revisions and recent excess stock 
returns is stronger for negative than positive excess stock returns. 
H2b: The positive association between target price revisions and other analysts’ 
consensus target price revisions is stronger for negative than positive excess stock 
returns. 
As Skinner (1994) and Kothari et al. (2009) discuss, an asymmetric reaction to 
bad news does not provide definitive evidence of managers’ either withholding or 
                                               
5 Recent literature on analysts’ access to management indicates the potential for managers to leak good 
news early to analysts. Greene et al. (2014) note that “brokerage analysts interact with firm management 
through visits to company headquarters, investor office meetings, and broker-hosted investor conferences.” 
Using a comprehensive record of interactions between executives of a large-cap NYSE-traded firm and 
sell-side analysts, Soltes (2014) examines the private interactions between managers and analysts and notes 
75 private interactions over a one-year sample period. The majority of these interactions are phone 
conversations but there are also interactions at conferences and office meetings and 43 percent of these 
interactions occur within 72 hours of some firm-initiated news. 
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accelerating bad news. If the asymmetric reaction is due to managers’ withholding bad 
news, however, the magnitude of the asymmetric reaction of analysts to bad and good 
news should be more pronounced for firms that are more likely to withhold bad news. 
Therefore, the final hypothesis we test is as follows. 
H3: The asymmetric sensitivity of analysts’ target price revisions to good and bad 
news is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to withhold bad news. 
3. Research design 
In this section, we propose an empirical model to examine analysts’ target price 
revisions. We also describe a corporate disclosure quality index, which we use to proxy 
firms’ tendency to withhold bad news in order to test hypothesis H3.   
3.1 An empirical model of analysts’ target price revisions 
To test our hypotheses on the relation between target price revisions and market 
returns, excess stock returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions (hypotheses H1a–
c), we begin by estimating the following model 
, , 0 1 2 , 3 , , , ,i j t t i t i j t i j t
RevTP β β RM β ExRet β RevCons ε= + + + +    (1) 
where i indexes stocks (firms), j indexes analysts, and t is the target price revision date, 
henceforth the target price date. Analyst j’s target price revision for stock i at time t, 
( ), , , , , , 1 , 1i j t i j t i j t i tRevTP TP TP P− −= − , is the difference between analyst j’s target price at time 
t and her target price at time t−1, where date t−1 is her most recent target price date before 
t, scaled by the closing stock price on the day before the previous target price date; 
t
RM  
is the return on the FTSE-All Share Index from t−1 to t; 
,i t
ExRet  is stock i’s excess stock 
return from t−1 to t, calculated as the difference between stock and market returns from 
t−1 to t; and 
, ,i j t
RevCons  is other analysts’ consensus target price revision, calculated as 
( ), , , , 1 , 1i j t i j t i tMeanOTP MeanOTP P− −− , where , ,i j tMeanOTP  is the mean target price of 
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analysts other than j for stock i between t−1 and t, taking the latest target price for each 
analyst.6 This is consistent with how previous studies calculate consensus forecasts (e.g., 
Clement et al., 2011; Bernhardt et al., 2006).7 Figure 1 illustrates the time line of our 
calculation of variables. We conduct the analysis at the analyst–stock level. According to 
Bradshaw and Brown (2006),8 brokerage firms assign an individual analyst or team to 
follow any one stock, so an analysis at the analyst–stock level should generate similar 
results to those from an analysis at the broker–stock level.  
In estimating model (1) and subsequent extensions of it, we include broker and 
industry fixed effects to control for common unobserved, but intertemporally constant, 
broker and industry characteristics. We also include year fixed effects to control factors 
that affect all forecast revisions in a particular year, e.g., during the financial crisis.  
Previous research suggests that analysts’ characteristics such as experience, 
workload, and association with a larger brokerage firm may affect their forecast properties 
and biases (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Brown and Hugon, 2009). Research also 
shows that analysts use information in stock returns and other analysts’ forecasts to revise 
their earnings forecasts (Abarbanell, 1991; Bernhardt et al., 2006; Clement et al., 2011). 
As earnings forecasts are an important input to target prices, the association between 
target price revisions and market returns, excess stock returns, and other analysts’ 
forecasts may be due to analysts using these information sources when revising their 
earnings forecasts. Similarly, the three information sources are likely to influence 
recommendation revisions. Due to these considerations, we control for analyst 
                                               
6 Appendix 1 defines all the variables in the study. 
7 All of our results are robust to using a variant of RevCons where we give greater weight to more recent 
other analysts’ target prices following Chen and Jiang (2006). 
8 This citation is to a working paper version of Bradshaw et al. (2013). Only the working paper version 
discussed this point.  
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characteristics and earnings forecast and recommendation revisions in an augmented 
version of model (1), as follows, 
, , 0 1 2 , 3 , , 4 , , 5 , ,
6 7 , 8 9 , 10 , , ,
 + 
i j t t i t i j t i j t i j t
it i t it i t i t i j t
RevTP β β RM β ExRet β RevCons β RevEPS β RevRecd
β FExp β IExp β NFirm β NInd β BrSize ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
  (2) 
In model (2), ( ), , , , 1 , 1i, j,t i j t i j t i tRevEPS EPS EPS P− −= − is the earnings forecast revision, which 
is the difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast at time t and the previous earnings 
forecast, scaled by the closing stock price on the day before the previous target price date. 
( ), , , , 1 4i, j,t i j t i j tRevRecd Recd Recd −= − −  is the recommendation revision, calculated as the 
difference between analyst j’s I/B/E/S coded recommendation at time t and the previous 
recommendation, multiplied by −1/4.9 Analyst characteristics are: firm experience (FExp) 
and industry experience (IExp), which equal the number of years the analyst has covered 
a company and an industry, respectively, up to the year before the target price date; the 
number of firms (NFirm) and industries (NInd) the analyst covers in the year before the 
target price date; and brokerage firm size (BrSize), which equals the number of analysts 
associated with the broker that employs the analyst in the year before the target price date. 
Previous studies examining recommendation revisions employ either a continuous 
measure of recommendation revisions (Feldman et al., 2012) or include dummy variables 
indicating whether a revision is an upgrade or downgrade from the previous revision 
(Asquith et al., 2005). Therefore, as an alternative to using RevRecd, we substitute three 
dummy variables: Upgrade equals 1 if RevRecd > 0, and 0 otherwise; Dngrade equals 1 
if RevRecd < 0, and 0 otherwise; and Reit equals 1 if analysts issue recommendations on 
both the current and previous target price dates, but the recommendation does not change. 
                                               
9 We adopt this measure from Feldman et al. (2012). We recode I/B/E/S analyst recommendations to a 
rating from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to a strong buy and 5 to a strong sell and multiply the 
recommendation change by −1/4 so that positive RevRecd indicates an upgrade and negative RevRecd 
indicates a downgrade. This measure not only shows whether the new recommendation is an upgrade or 
downgrade from the previous one, but also captures the magnitude of the revision.  
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There are cases where analysts have only one recommendation associated with either the 
current or the previous target price date. In these cases, we set RevRecd to zero and Reit 
to zero instead of 1. In other words, for recommendation revisions, there are four types: 
upgrade, downgrade, reiteration, and no recommendation at either the current or the 
previous target price date.  
 3.2 Analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good news 
We examine whether target price revisions are more sensitive to bad than good firm-
specific news (hypotheses H2a–b) using the following augmented version of model (2),10  
, , 0 1 2 , 3 , , 4 ,
5 , 6 , ,
7 , , , 8 , , 9 , ,
10 , , , 11 ,
i j t t i t i j t i t
i t t i t i t
i t i j t i j t i j t
i t i j t i t
RevTP β β RM β ExRet β RevCons β BadExRet
β BadExRet RM β BadExRet ExRet
β BadExRet RevCons β RevEPS β RevRecd
β BadExRet RevEPS β BadExRet R
= + + + +
+ × + ×
+ × + +
+ × + ×
, ,
12 13 , 14 15 , 16 , , ,
 + 
i j t
it i t it i t i t i j t
evRecd
β FExp β IExp β NFirm β NInd β BrSize ε+ + + + +
 (3) 
where BadExReti,t is our indicator of firm-specific bad news and equals 1 if the excess 
return on stock i between t‒1 and t is negative, and 0 otherwise.11 Positive coefficients on 
BadExRet × ExRet and BadExRet × RevCons provide support for hypotheses H2a and 
H2b respectively. As the tendency of firms to withhold bad news does not provide a clear 
implication for the case of market return, we have no predictions for the sign of the 
coefficient on BadExRet × RM.  
As the interval between consecutive forecasts varies across observations, we deflate 
all regressions by the square root of the number of calendar days between the previous 
and current forecasts to address heteroscedasticity arising from varying revision 
                                               
10 We estimate a corresponding model where we replace RevRecd with the dummy variables Upgrade, 
Downgrade, and Reit. 
11 Negative market returns and negative revisions of other analysts’ forecasts can imply bad news. But since 
our main interest is in analysts’ reactions to firm-specific bad and good news, we use negative excess stock 
returns as our main indicator of firm-specific bad news. Repeating the analysis with three different measures 
of bad news indicated by negative market returns, negative excess stock returns, and negative other 
analysts’ forecast revisions leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. 
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periods.12 To control for other forms of heteroscedasticity and correlated regression 
errors, we report t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and year following the multi-dimensional clustering suggested by Petersen 
(2009). 
3.3 Withholding bad news and the asymmetric reaction to good and bad news 
We predict that analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good news is greater for 
firms that are more likely to withhold bad news. We therefore need to identify firms that 
are more or less likely to withhold bad news. The main measure we use to identify firms’ 
tendency to withhold bad news is a disclosure quality index, DiscInd.13 A higher DiscInd 
value implies higher disclosure quality. As a measure of disclosure quality, DiscInd 
proxies for information uncertainty surrounding a firm in a particular year and therefore 
for the opportunities that a firm has to strategically withhold bad news.14  
After obtaining DiscInd for every firm–year in our sample, we sort target price 
revisions into quintiles based on DiscInd. The top quintile includes target price revisions 
for firms with the highest disclosure quality while the bottom quintile contains revisions 
for firms with the lowest disclosure quality. We then re-estimate model (3) within these 
quintiles. As we use DiscInd to measure firms’ tendency to withhold bad news, we expect 
the coefficients on BadExRet × ExRet and BadExRet × RevCons to be higher in the low 
than in the high disclosure quality quintiles.15 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
 
                                               
12 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we do not make this deflation.  
13 Appendix 2 provides a detailed description of DiscInd. 
14 Kothari et al. (2009) argue that firms associated with higher information uncertainty have more 
opportunities to withhold bad news. 
15 An alternative way to test this hypothesis is to interact the disclosure index with the variables of interest 
and examine the coefficients on BadExRet × ExRet and DiscInd × BadExRet × ExRet. Conducting this 
robustness test gives results that are consistent with running separate regression across quintiles. We opt 
for the separate regression approach because it does not impose identical coefficients on non-interacted 
variables. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness test.  
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4.1 Sample selection 
We obtain target price, earnings forecast, and recommendation data for UK listed 
firms from the I/B/E/S database.16 We convert all I/B/E/S foreign currency denominated 
target prices and earnings forecasts into British currency using the I/B/E/S Daily Currency 
Exchange Rates file and the Report Currency file. We eliminate multiple intraday target 
prices, recommendations, and earnings forecasts, and keep the latest forecasts and 
recommendations by each brokerage firm for each stock on each research report day.17 
We merge these observations with Datastream stock prices and market returns. We 
initially merge the data using I/B/E/S tickers. Where I/B/E/S and Datastream stock tickers 
are inconsistent, we use CUSIP codes to merge the data. For any data that we cannot 
merge, we manually match the data based on company names. We merge the disclosure 
index data with the merged IBES–Datastream data using Datastream identification codes.  
The adjustment factors I/B/E/S and Datastream apply to adjust target prices and 
earnings forecasts for corporate actions differ for some observations. For these 
observations, we re-adjust I/B/E/S target prices to make them consistent with Datastream 
adjusted stock prices by multiplying them by the I/B/E/S adjustment factors and dividing 
by the Datastream adjustment factors.18  
The initial sample has 201,200 observations, consisting of 12-month-ahead target 
prices for UK listed stocks from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2014. To select our final 
sample, we apply the following filters. 
(1) For each target price observation, there are corresponding Datastream stock price 
data. 
                                               
16 We select all stocks that have the country code ‘EX’ in the I/B/E/S Detail Price Targets, I/B/E/S Detail 
History file and Recommendation file.  
17 We use time-stamps in the I/B/E/S files to identify the latest target prices, recommendations, and earnings 
forecasts.      
18 The data remain largely the same if we use unadjusted target prices and earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S 
and adjust using the adjustment factors from Datastream. 
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(2) For each target price observation, the same analyst issued a target price for the 
same company between 30 and 360 days earlier. 
(3) For each target price observation there is at least one target price from another 
analyst for the same company between the previous and current target price dates.  
(4) Each target price observation is associated with available data for the disclosure 
index and I/B/E/S data to calculate analyst coverage. 
(5) Each target price observation is associated with available data to calculate 
earnings forecasts and recommendation revisions. 
Criterion (2) ensures stale or very short-term target price revisions do not affect our 
results. The other criteria ensure that observations in the final sample are associated with 
non-missing data to calculate target price revisions, stock returns, earnings forecast 
revisions, recommendation revisions, other analyst target price revisions, and other key 
variables in the study.  
For criterion (5), we retain target prices where the accompanying earnings forecasts 
and recommendations are issued within the past 90 days. When both the current and 
previous target prices have accompanying earnings forecasts and recommendations, we 
calculate the earnings forecast revision and recommendation revision as section 3 
describes. When the current target price has accompanying earnings forecasts and 
recommendations but the previous one does not or vice versa, we assume the earnings 
forecast and recommendation revisions are zero.  
Table 1 reports the number of observations lost and remaining after each filter. 
The final sample comprises 27,288 observations issued by 2,725 analysts working for 201 
brokerage firms and following 1,104 stocks. The sample period starts on 1 January 2003 
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and ends on 31 December 2014. We winsorize the main variables in our analysis, 
including RevTP, RM, ExRet, and RevCons at the 1st and 99th percentiles.19 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section reports summary statistics and Pearson correlations between the main 
variables in the analysis. Table 2, panel A reports statistics for the whole sample, panels 
B and C report statistics for the good news (ExRet ≥ 0) and bad news (ExRet < 0) 
subsamples, and panel D reports p-values for tests of whether the means of the variables 
in panels B and C differ.  
In panel A, the mean target price to stock price ratio (TPRatio) is 1.12, showing that, 
on average, analysts set target prices about 12 percent higher than current stock prices. In 
panels B and C the means of this ratio are 1.088 and 1.154, suggesting that analysts set 
more optimistic target prices following bad news than good news.20 Recommendation 
revisions are positive in panels B and C, and panel D shows that they do not differ 
significantly. These findings are consistent with the conclusions of previous studies that 
analysts make optimistic forecasts (Lin and Nichols, 1998; Das et al., 1998; Michaely and 
Womack, 1999; Cowen et al., 2006; Ke and Yu, 2006) and indicate that analysts are 
reluctant to issue pessimistic target prices and revise recommendations downwards when 
they receive bad news.  
The mean target price revision (RevTP) and earnings forecast revision (RevEPS) are 
negative in panel C (−0.105 and −0.004) while they are positive in panel B (0.124 and 
0.001), indicating that analysts revise target prices and earnings forecasts in the direction 
of the news in excess stock returns. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the mean and median 
target price revisions are smaller than the magnitudes of excess stock returns between the 
                                               
19 Conducting the analysis with corresponding truncated instead of winsorised data leaves the results 
qualitatively unaffected.  
20 A t-test shows that the difference is significant at 1 percent.  
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previous and current target price dates in panels B and C. This suggests that analysts 
underreact relative to the information in excess stock returns. This is consistent with the 
evidence in previous studies that analysts underreact to information in stock returns 
(Abarbanell, 1991; Clement et al., 2011).  These statistics also help to explain why the 
mean TPRatio in panel C exceeds one: analysts tend to move their target prices down 
when they receive bad news, but the revision is less than the stock price fall.  
The mean and median intervals between consecutive forecasts by the same analyst 
for the same company (DayInt) are 111 and 91 days. Mean DayInt in the bad news 
subsample is 112.92, significantly higher than in the good news subsample (109.23). 
Panel D shows that there are no significant differences in the disclosure index and analyst 
coverage between the bad and good news subsamples. Although the results in panel D 
suggest there are differences in analyst characteristics associated with bad and good news, 
the differences are not economically significant except for broker size.  
Table 3 reports Pearson correlations between the variables. There are significant 
positive correlations of target price revisions with market returns, excess stock returns, 
and other analysts’ consensus target price revisions. Target price revisions are also 
positively correlated with earnings forecast revisions, consistent with Clement et al., 
(2011). The bad news indicator (BadExRet) is negatively correlated with target price 
revisions, earnings forecast revisions, market returns, excess stock returns, and other 
analysts’ consensus target price revisions, consistent with the statistics in table 2. The 
disclosure quality index (DiscInd) is positively correlated with analyst coverage 
(AnFollow), consistent with higher disclosure quality reducing information asymmetry 
and attracting a higher analyst following.  
5. Empirical analysis  
5.1 Analysts’ target price revisions   
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Table 4 reports the results of regressing target price revisions on market returns, 
excess stock returns, and other analysts’ consensus target price revisions. Columns 1–3 
show the results for individual information sources, column 4 reports the results of 
estimating model (1), and column 5 reports the results for model (2). The coefficients on 
RM, ExRet, and RevCons in columns 1–3 show that target price revisions are significantly 
associated with market returns, excess stock returns, and other analysts’ consensus target 
price revisions. The adjusted R-squared in column 2 is higher than in columns 1 and 3, 
suggesting that the firm-specific information in excess stock returns is the most important 
factor explaining target price revisions.  
Column 4 shows that RM, ExRet and RevCons all contribute incrementally to 
explaining analysts’ target price revisions, consistent with hypotheses H1a–c. The 
positive coefficient on RevCons implies either that analysts find other analysts’ forecasts 
to be incrementally informative over the information in market and excess stock returns, 
consistent with Lys and Sohn (1990) and Clement et al. (2011), or that, on average, they 
respond similarly to information that market and excess stock returns do not capture. 
Including earnings forecast and recommendation revisions and analyst characteristic as 
control variables in column 5 shows that the two revision variables are significant, but 
the results for our main three variables of interest remain essentially unchanged.  
5.2 Analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good news  
We now examine the hypothesis that analysts react more strongly to bad than to good 
news when revising their target prices by estimating versions of model (3). Table 5, panel 
A, reports the results. In column 1, which includes control variables for analyst 
characteristics, the new and important result is that while the positive coefficients on 
market returns and other analysts’ consensus target price revisions are not significantly 
different for bad and good news, the positive coefficient on firm-specific excess returns 
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is significantly higher for bad than for good news observations. This supports hypothesis 
H2a that analysts’ target price revisions are more sensitive to the information captured by 
firm-specific excess returns when this indicates bad news. However, we find no support 
for hypothesis H2b that the positive association between target price revision and other 
analysts’ consensus target price revisions is stronger when firm-specific excess returns 
imply bad news.21  
Columns 2 and 3, which also control for earnings forecast revisions and the 
alternative specification of recommendation revisions, show that the coefficients on these 
controls are significant, but do not change the key result on the incremental sensitivity of 
target price revisions to bad news in excess stock returns. The positive coefficients on 
RevRecd, Upgrade, and RevEPS implies that when analysts revise earnings forecasts and 
recommendations upward, they also revise target prices upward, while the negative 
coefficient on Dngrade implies that analysts revise target prices downward when they 
downgrade stocks. These results suggest that, on average, analysts are consistent in the 
way they revise target prices, earnings, and recommendations.  
Regarding the rejection of hypothesis H2b, we conjecture that although both excess 
stock returns and other analysts’ consensus target price revisions can reflect firm-specific 
news, other analysts’ consensus target price revisions also reflect analysts’ private 
information about firm performance and their own biases. Therefore, when we include 
both ExRet and RevCons in the same model, excess stock returns capture more firm-
specific publicly available news than do other analysts’ forecasts and thus subsume any 
asymmetric reaction effect in other analysts’ forecast revisions. We test this argument by 
                                               
21 While we have no specific predictions or theory for how analysts react to bad and good news in market 
returns, we examine this in an untabulated analysis. We include indicators of bad market news (BadRM) 
and other analysts’ revisions’ bad news (BadRevCons) and their interactions with RM and RevCons. BadRM 
equals 1 if RM < 0, 0 otherwise; BadRevCons equals 1 if RevCons < 0, 0 otherwise. The results show that 
the coefficients on BadRM × RM and BadRevCons × RevCons are insignificant, implying that target price 
revisions react symmetrically to bad and good news in market returns and other analysts’ revisions.  
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re-estimating model (3) without ExRet and BadExRet × ExRet. Table 5, panel B reports 
the results. Column 1 shows the results of estimating the complete model (3) while 
column 2 presents the estimation results without ExRet and BadExRet × ExRet. Excluding 
these variables from model (3), BadExret × RevCons has a significantly positive 
coefficient, consistent with hypothesis H2b. This supports the conjecture that we reject 
H2b in our main analysis because the asymmetric reaction effect of ExRet subsumes that 
of RevCons. The result in column 2 of panel B, Table 5 also shows that if we use RevCons 
as the only source of firm-specific news, we find evidence consistent with target price 
revisions being more sensitive to the information in firm-specific excess stock returns 
when this indicates bad news. 
5.3 Withholding bad news and the asymmetric reaction to good and bad news  
The evidence in table 5 shows that analysts’ target price revisions are more sensitive 
to firm-specific bad news. Nevertheless, this result does not indicate whether the 
asymmetric reaction of analysts is due to managers’ tendency to withhold bad news. 
Alternative explanations for the asymmetric reaction to bad and good news is managers’ 
accelerating bad news or the higher credibility of bad news. Therefore, we apply the 
analysis of section 3.3 to examine whether managers’ withholding of bad news drives the 
asymmetric responsiveness of analysts’ target price revisions to bad and good news.  
For each year in the sample period, we assign each firm its disclosure quality index 
(DiscInd). Firms with a lower value of DiscInd have lower disclosure quality. Our 
argument is that firms with lower disclosure quality are subject to greater information 
uncertainty and are more likely to withhold and accumulate bad news. We re-estimate 
model (3) for quintiles ranked by DiscInd values. We expect to find a more pronounced 
asymmetric reaction of analyst target price revisions for firms with lower disclosure 
quality.  
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Table 6 reports the result of estimating model (3) for quintiles sorted by DiscInd. The 
first column presents results for the lowest disclosure quality quintile while the final 
column presents results for the highest disclosure quality quintile. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, there is no asymmetric reaction of analysts to good and bad news in quintiles 
4 and 5, whereas there is a significant asymmetric reaction in quintiles 1–3. A test for the 
difference between the average coefficients in columns 1–3 versus 4–5 is significant at 
5%.22 This suggests that analysts react symmetrically to bad and good news for firms with 
high disclosure quality, whereas they react asymmetrically to bad and good news for firms 
with low disclosure quality.  
These results support our hypothesis that the asymmetric reaction of analysts to firm-
specific bad and good news in excess stock returns is more pronounced for firms with 
higher information uncertainty, which have more opportunity and are more likely to 
withhold bad news. In contrast, if the asymmetric reaction pattern was due to managers’ 
accelerating bad news but revealing good news gradually, we would not observe a 
stronger asymmetric reaction for firms that are more likely to withhold bad news.23  
5.4 Robustness check 
In section 5.3, we argue that managers’ tendency to withhold bad news and 
disclose good news early drives analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good news and 
present evidence that the asymmetric pattern is more pronounced for low disclosure 
quality firms. In this section, we employ an alternative proxy for information uncertainty 
                                               
22 A test of the difference between the average coefficients in columns 1–2 versus 4–5 is significant at 1%. 
23 Following a suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, in a supplementary analysis we estimate model (3) 
conditioning on firms experiencing large changes in DiscInd, defined as the 20 percent highest and lowest 
annual changes in DiscInd. This analysis shows that, relative to other firms, firms have no significant 
change in their asymmetric reaction to bad and good news after large increases in DiscInd, but that firms 
have a stronger asymmetric reaction to bad and good news after large decreases in DiscInd. This result is 
consistent with the asymmetric reaction of analysts to firm-specific bad and good news in excess stock 
returns becoming more pronounced after large increases in firms’ information uncertainty. Details of these 
results are available on request. 
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and for firms’ tendency to withhold bad news and conduct a similar analysis to section 
5.3.  
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) use analyst coverage as a proxy for information 
asymmetry.24 We therefore use analyst coverage (AnFollow) as an alternative proxy for 
firms’ tendency to withhold bad news. We examine whether analysts’ asymmetric 
reaction to bad and good news is higher for firms with low analyst coverage. We measure 
AnFollow as the highest number of analysts following the firm in the fiscal year before 
the target price revision date. We sort observations in each year into quintiles based on 
AnFollow in ascending order. The top quintile includes target price revisions for firms 
with the highest AnFollow, while the bottom quintile includes revisions for firms with the 
lowest AnFollow. We then re-estimate model (3) for these quintiles. Table 7 reports the 
results.  
The first column of table 7 reports results for the lowest analyst following quintile, 
while the final column reports results for the highest analyst following quintile. The 
coefficient on BadExRet × ExRet is again positive for quintiles 1–3, while it is 
insignificant for quintiles 4–5.25 These results, though providing weaker evidence than in 
table 6, also suggest that target price revisions are more sensitive to bad than good news 
in excess stock returns for firms with a low analyst following, consistent with our 
argument that firms with low analyst coverage (higher information asymmetry) are more 
likely to withhold bad news.26 
                                               
24 The correlation between analyst coverage and disclosure index in our sample is 0.442, suggesting that 
these two measures do not capture the same characteristics. In an untabulated two-way frequency table, we 
find that there are a material numbers of observations in cells with low (high) levels of the disclosure index 
and high (low) analyst following. 
25 A test for the difference in the average coefficients in quintiles 1–3 versus 4–5 is not significant. The 
difference in the average coefficients in quintiles 1–3 versus 5, however, is significant at 5 percent. 
26 Adopting the alternative approach of interacting analyst coverage with the variables of interest gives 
consistent results (cf. fn.15).  
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The results in tables 6 and 7 are robust to using the alternative specification of 
recommendation revisions and to replacing BadExRet with the indicator Bad, which 
equals 1 when stock return is negative and 0 otherwise.27 We also replicate the results 
using standard errors clustered by broker–year-end and analyst–forecast date with the 
findings remaining qualitatively unchanged.  
6. Conclusion 
We examine the relation between analysts’ target price revisions and market returns, 
excess stock returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. We find a strong positive 
correlation between analysts’ target price revisions and market returns, excess stock 
returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions, after controlling for earnings forecasts 
and recommendation revisions. This is consistent with prior studies of earnings forecasts 
by Clement et al. (2011) and Abarbanell (1991), suggesting that analysts extract 
information from public signals such as investors’ actions and other analysts’ reports and 
incorporate these into their forecasts. However, although the reported associations 
between target price revisions and our hypothesised indicators of news are strong, we 
have not established the extent to which they are causal. It is possible that there are other, 
unobserved, sources of information that cause analysts to revise their target prices, and 
this information also causes share prices to change and causes other analysts to revise 
their the target prices. 
An important contribution of our study is that we examine whether firms’ strategic 
disclosures of bad and good news drive analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good 
news when revising target prices. We find that when analysts revise their target prices, 
they rely more heavily on firm-specific information when this information is bad than 
                                               
27 Some studies use negative stock return to represent bad news (e.g. Basu, 1997).  
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when it is good. Sorting observations into quintiles using a disclosure quality index as a 
proxy for firm’s tendency to withhold bad news, we find that the asymmetric analyst 
reaction to bad and good news is pronounced among firms with low disclosure quality 
while the pattern disappears for firms with high disclosure quality. Our findings largely 
remain when we use analyst coverage as an alternative proxy for firms’ tendency to 
withhold bad news. 
These results support our hypothesis that due to firms’ tendency to withhold bad news 
but release good news promptly, analysts react asymmetrically to bad and good news 
when revising their target prices. These findings are consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), 
who show that firms’ asymmetric reactions to bad and good news disclosures leads to the 
asymmetric reaction of stock prices to good and bad news disclosures.  
Our study has implications for the analyst literature. Our findings suggest that how 
analysts use information is conditional on how managers disclose this information and 
that they react asymmetrically to bad and good news, as do general market participants. 
Therefore, although analysts may gain access to good news early and convey this through 
their forecasts of future earnings, earnings growth, and positive tone in their reports, they 
are unlikely to be able to provide such benefits in the case of bad news.  
Our paper suggests avenues that future studies should explore. First, we argue that 
managers’ strategic disclosures are the main driver of analysts’ asymmetric reaction to 
bad and good news. Future studies could test alternative explanations for analysts’ 
asymmetric reaction to firm-specific bad and good news. For example, analysts may be 
subject to loss-aversion and confirmation bias. They may fail to cut their target prices in 
anticipation of bad news, forcing them to reduce their target prices sharply on the 
disclosure of bad news. Besides cognitive biases, analysts’ economic incentive biases 
may contribute to this effect. Even when they are aware of bad news, analysts may have 
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economic incentives to defer downward target price revisions until the news becomes 
public. These arguments do not exclude our explanation, however, and do not explain 
why analysts’ asymmetric reaction is stronger for firms that are more likely to withhold 
bad news.  
Second, our results suggest that the relation between target price revisions and 
earnings forecast revisions is lower in firms with higher disclosure quality. The literature 
provides little insight into how analysts incorporate earnings, growth, and risk into their 
target prices and whether their reliance on these factors differs depending on the quality 
of accounting information or non-financial disclosures. Direct engagement with analysts 
may also help to shed light on these issues. Future studies could explore this avenue.  
Third, we employ a disclosure quality index and analyst coverage as two proxies 
for managers’ withholding of bad news. While these measures capture opportunities for 
managers to withhold bad news and therefore should be correlated with bad news 
accumulation, they are indirect and noisy proxies for managers’ withholding of bad news. 
Future studies should look for better proxies for managers’ withholding of bad news. 
Finally, some studies suggest that investor sentiment may affect analyst 
behaviour. As we do not distinguish sentiment factors from fundamental aspects of 
information in market returns, excess stock returns, and other analysts’ forecasts, future 
studies can extend our research in this direction.  
  
  26 
References 
Abarbanell, J. S., 1991. Do analysts’ earnings forecasts incorporate information in prior 
stock prices changes? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14 (2), 147–165. 
 
Aboody, D. and Kasznik, R., 2000. CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate 
voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 29 (1), 73–100. 
 
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M., and Au, A., 2005. Information content of equity analyst reports. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 75 (2), 245–282.  
 
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 3–37. 
 
Bernhardt, D., Campello, M. and Kutsoati, E., 2006. Who herds? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 80 (3), 657–675. 
 
Bilinski, P., Lyssimachou, D., and Walker, M., 2013. Target price accuracy: International 
evidence. The Accounting Review, 88 (3), 825–851. 
 
Bilinski, P., Douglas, C., Hass, L., Stathopoulos, K., and Walker, M . 2015. Strategic 
distortions in analyst target prices in the presence of short-term institutional investors. 
Working Paper. Cass Business School. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2579576. 
 
Bradshaw, M.T., 2011. Analysts’ forecasts: What do we know after decades of work? 
Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880339. 
 
Bradshaw, M.T. and Brown, L., 2006. Do sell-side analysts exhibit differential target price 




Bradshaw, M.T., Brown, L.D. and Huang, K., 2013. Do sell-side analysts exhibit 
differential target price forecasting ability? Review of Accounting Studies, 18, 
930−955. 
 
Bradshaw, M.T., Huang, A.G., and Tan, H., 2014. Analyst target price optimism around 
the world. Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137291. 
 
Brav, A. and Lehavy, R., 2003. An empirical analysis of analysts’ target prices: short-
term informativeness and long-term dynamics’, Journal of Finance, 58 (5), 1933–
1967. 
 
Brown, L.D. and Hugon, A., 2009. Team earnings forecasting. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 14 (4), 587–607.  
 
Brown, L.D., Call, A.C., Clement, M.B., and Sharp, N.Y., 2015. Inside the “Black Box” 
of sell-side financial analysts. Journal of Accounting Research, 53 (1), 1–47. 
 
  27 
CFIE, 2015. The Corporate Financial Information Environment web-based annual report 
scoring tool (http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/cfie/). 
 
Chambers, A. E. and Penman, S.H., 1984. Timeliness of reporting and the stock price 
reaction to earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 22 (1), 21–47. 
 
Chen, Q. and Jiang, W., 2006. Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. 
Review of Financial Studies, 19, 319−355. 
 
Cheng, Q. and Lo, K., 2006. Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 44 (5), 815–848. 
 
Clarkson, P., Nekrasov, A., Simon, A. and Tutticci, I., 2013. Target price forecasts: 
Fundamental and behavioral factors. Working paper, University of California-Irvine.  




Clement, M. B., Hales, J. and Xue, Y., 2011. Understanding analysts’ use and under-–use 
of stock returns and other analysts’ forecasts when forecasting earnings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 51 (3), 279–299.  
 
Clement, M., 1999. Analyst forecast accuracy: do ability, resources, and portfolio 
complexity matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27 (3), 285–303. 
 
Conrad, J., Bradford, C., Landsman, W., and Rountree, B.R., 2006. How do analysts 
recommendations respond to major news? Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 41 (1), 25–49. 
 
Cowen, A., Groysberg, B. and Healy, M. P., 2006. Which types of analyst firms are more 
optimistic? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41 (1–2), 119–146. 
 
Da, Z. and Schaumburg, E., 2011. Relative valuation and analyst target price forecasts. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 14, 161–192.  
 
Das, S., Levine, C., and Sivaramakrishnan, K., 1998. Earnings predictability and bias in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review, 73 (2), 277–294.  
 
Dechow, P. and You, H., 2013. Understanding and predicting target price valuation errors. 
Working paper, University of California, Berkeley. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412813 
  
Demirakos E., Strong N.C., and Walker M., 2004. What valuation methodologies do 
analysts use? Accounting Horizons 18, 221–240. 
 
Dye, R., 1985. Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23 (1), 123–145. 
 
  28 
El Haj, M., Rayson, P., Walker, M., and Young, S., 2014. Detecting document structure 
in a very large corpus of U.K. Financial Reports. Language Resources and Evaluation 
Conference, 26–31 May 2014. 
 
El Haj, M., Rayson, P., Walker, M., and Young, S., 2015. Large-sample analysis of U.K. 
annual report narratives: Methods and evidence. Working Paper. Lancaster 
University. 
 
Ertimur, Y., Sletten, E., and Sunder, J., 2014. Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: 
Evidence from IPO lockup expirations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 58, 
79–95. 
 
Feldman, R., Livnat, J. and Zhang, Y., 2012. Analysts’ earnings forecast, recommendation 
and target price revisions. Journal of Portfolio Management, 38 (3), 120–132. 
 
Frankel, R., McNichols, M., and Wilson, G. P., 1995. Discretionary disclosure and 
external financing. The Accounting Review, 70 (1), 135–150. 
 
Ge, R. and Lennox, C., 2011. Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news 
when they finance their acquisition using equity? Review of Accounting Studies, 16 
(1), 183–217. 
 
Green, T.C., J. Russell, Markov, S., and Subasi, M., 2014. Access to management and the 
informativeness of analyst research. Journal of Financial Economics 114, 239−255.   
 
Hong, H., Lim, T., and Stein, J. C., 2000. Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst coverage 
and the profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance, 55 (1), 265–295. 
 
Jung, W. and Kwon, Y., 1988. Disclosure when the market is unsure of information 
endowment of managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 26 (1), 146–153. 
 
Ke, B. and Yu, Y., 2006. The effect of issuing biased earnings forecasts on analysts’ 
access of management and survival. Journal of Accounting Research, 44 (5), 965–
999. 
 
Kothari, S. P., Shu S., and Wysocki, P. D., 2009. Do managers withhold bad news? 
Journal of Accounting Research, 47 (1), 1–36. 
 
Lin, H. and McNichols, M., 1998. Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and investment recommendations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25 (1), 
101–127. 
 
Lys, T. and Sohn, S., 1990. The association between revisions of financial analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and security price changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
13 (4), 341–363. 
 
Michaely, R. and Womack, K., 1999. Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter 
analyst recommendations. Review of Financial Studies, 12 (4), 653–686. 
 
  29 
Mikhail, M.B. and Willis, R., 1997. Do security analysts improve their performance with 
experience? Journal of Accounting Research, 35, 131–157. 
 
Pae, S., 2005. Selective disclosures in the presence of uncertainty about information 
endowment. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 383–409. 
 
Petersen, M., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1), 435–480. 
 
Short, H. and Keasey, K. 1999. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: 
Evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 5, 79–101. 
 
Skinner, D.J., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32 (1), 38–60. 
 
Soltes, E., 2014. Private interaction between firm management and sell-side analysts. 
Journal of Accounting Research 52, 245−272. 
 
Verrecchia, R. E., 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
5 (1), 179–194. 
 
Welch, I., 2000. Herding among security analysts. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 
369–396. 
 
Yermack, D., 1997. Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news 
announcements. Journal of Finance, 52 (2), 449–476.  
 
  
  30 
Appendix 1. Definitions of key variables 
Variable Definition 
AnFollow Analyst following, equal to the highest number of analysts following 
the firm in the most recent fiscal year before the target price revision 
date.  
BadExRet A dummy variable equal to 1 if excess stock return is negative, and 0 
otherwise. 
BrSize Brokerage firm size, equal to the number of analysts associated with 
the broker that employs the analyst in the year before the target price 
date. 
DayInt The number of days between two consecutive target prices issued by 
the same analyst for each stock 
DiscInd Disclosure index from the CFIE web-based annual report scoring tool. 
Dngrade Indicator of a downward recommendation revision, equal to 1 if 
RecRecd < 0 and 0 otherwise. 
ExRet Excess stock return, equal to the difference between the stock return 
and the market return. 
FExp Firm experience, equal to the number of years the analyst has covered 
a company up to the year before the target price date. 
IExp Industry experience, equal to the number of years the analyst has 
covered an industry up to the year before the target price date. 
NFirm Number of firms the analyst of interest covers in the year before the 
target price date. 
NInd Number of industries the analyst of interest covers in the year before 
the target price date. 
Reit Indicator of a reiteration recommendation revision, equal to 1 if the 
analyst issues recommendations on both the current and previous 
target price dates but the recommendation does not change, 0 
otherwise. 
Return Return on the stock between the previous and the current target price 
date. 
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RevCons 
 
Other analysts’ consensus target price revision, equal to 
( ), , , , 1 , 1i j t j t j t i tRevCons MeanOTP MeanOTP P− −= − , where MeanOTPj,t is 
the mean outstanding target price of analysts other than j for stock i 
between t−1 and t, taking the latest target price for each analyst.  
RevEPS Earnings forecast revision, ( ), , , , 1 , 1i, j,t i j t i j t i tRevEPS EPS EPS P− −= − , equal 
to the difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast at time t and the 
previous earnings forecast, scaled by the closing stock price on the 
day before the previous target price date. 
RevRecd Recommendation revision, ( ), , , , 1 4i, j,t i j t i j tRevRecd Recd Recd −= − − , 
equal to the difference between analyst j’s I/B/E/S coded 
recommendation at time t and the previous recommendation, 
multiplied by −1/4. 
RevTP Target price revision, ( ), , , , , , 1 , 1i j t i j t i j t i tRevTP TP TP P− −= − , equal to the 
difference between analyst j’s target price at time t and the previous 
target price, scaled by the closing stock price on the day before the 
previous target price date. 
RM Market return, equal to the return on the FTSE-All Share Index from 
t−1 to t 
TPRatio Target price over closing stock price on the day before the 
announcement date of the new target price.  
Upgrade Indicator of an upward recommendation revision, equal to 1 if 
RecRecd > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 2. Description of the disclosure index 
The disclosure index we use, DiscInd, is based on the output of the CFIE web-based 
annual report scoring tool. The CFIE project uses the web tool to score the linguistic 
properties of 11,313 annual reports over 2003 to 2013. El Haj et al. (2014, 2015) describe 
how this tool identifies the main section headings of annual reports and scores their 
linguistic properties section by section, distinguishing between the front sections (such as 
highlights, performance commentaries, business strategy, risk, remuneration, and 
governance) and rear sections (such as accounting policies, the audit report, financial 
statements, and notes to the accounts).  
 The disclosure index is an equally weighted sum of eight components, with each 
component being a percentage ranking of a particular linguistic property of an annual 
report relative to the 11,313 annual reports in the CFIE (2015) sample. A higher 
disclosure index implies higher disclosure quality. The eight linguistic components are as 
follows. 
̶ Strategic word count. The relative ranking of the number of times the words and 
phrases in a list of strategic keywords and phrases appear in the front-end sections 
of the annual report, excluding the governance and remuneration sections. The list 
of strategic keywords and phrases is from CFIE (2015). 
̶ Rear-end word count. The relative ranking of the number of words in the rear-end 
sections of the report.  
̶ Governance and remuneration word count. The relative ranking of the number of 
words in the governance and remuneration sections of the annual report. 
̶ Performance commentary word count. The relative ranking of the number of  
words in all front-end performance review sections (i.e., section headings of the 
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form: Highlights, Chairman’s Statement, CEO Review, Financial Review, 
Business Review, Review of Operations). 
̶ Causal reasoning word count in performance review sections. The relative 
ranking of the number of causal key words appearing in the performance review 
sections. This proxies for the extent to which the review sections provide an 
explanation of performance. The list of commonly used causal reasoning key 
words is from CFIE (2015). 
̶ Readability (Fog Index). The relative ranking of the readability of the 
performance review sections times minus 1. The Fog index is an estimate of the 
reading age required to understand a piece of text. Higher values of the Fog index 
indicate that the text is more difficult to understand. Where an annual report 
contains more than one performance review section the Fog index is the weighted 
average Fog score for each section where the weights are the relative number of 
words in each section. 
̶ Other front-end word count. The relative ranking of the number of words in the 
front-end of the annual report excluding the review, governance, and 
remuneration sections.  
̶ Forward looking word count. The relative ranking of the number of forward 
looking key words appearing in all sections of the report. The list of forward 
looking key words is from CFIE (2015). 
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Figure 1. Illustration of our empirical design 
This figure illustrates the main concepts and timeline used in our empirical design. RevTP 
is the target price revision, RM is the market return, ExRet is excess stock return and 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
This table reports the sample selection steps in our study and the number of observations 






Target prices for UK listed companies, from 1 January 
2003 to 31 December 2014, with a 12-month forecast 
horizon. For each analyst, on each target price date, we 
keep only the latest target price for each company. 
 
201,200 
Drop observations without stock price data from 
Datastream 
18,952 182,248 
Drop observations without at least one previous target 
price by the same analyst for the same company  
59,237 123,011 
Drop observations where the target price forecast horizon 
differs from 12 months or the interval between 
consecutive target prices is not between 30 and 360 days. 
5,568 117,443 
Drop observations without available data to calculate the 
disclosure quality index  
44,470   72,973 
Drop observations without available data to calculate 
analyst coverage 
258 72,715 
Drop observations without available data to calculate other 
analyst consensus target prices 
18,311 54,404 
Drop observations without available data to calculate 
earnings forecast revisions 
5,112 49,292 




Table 2. Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for selected variables in the study. Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sample, panel B for 
observations with non-negative excess stock returns (the good news sample), and panel C for observations with negative excess stock returns (the 
bad news sample). The summary statistics are the mean, the median, the 1st and 99th percentile values, the maximum and minimum values, and the 
standard deviation. Panel D reports the results of tests of differences in means in panels B and C. TPRatio is target price over stock price, RevTP 
is the target price revision, Return denotes stock return, RM is market return, ExRet is excess stock return, RevCons is consensus target price 
revisions of other analysts, RevEPS is earnings forecast revision; RevRecd is recommendation revision; DayInt is the days between consecutive 
forecasts; AnFollow is analyst coverage; NFirm is the number of firms covered by the analyst of interest; NInd is the number of industries covered 
by the analyst of interest; IExp is analyst’s industry experience; FExp is analyst’ firm experience; BrSize is brokerage firm size; and BadExRet is 
an indicator of firm-specific bad news (ExRet < 0). Appendix 1 gives a detailed explanation of the variables.  
 
Panel A. Full sample (N = 27,288)      
 Mean Median P1 P99 Max Min Std 
TPRratio 1.120 1.095 0.685 1.951 2.738 0.685 0.222 
RevTP 0.014 0.030 −0.830 0.777 0.777 −0.920 0.246 
Return 0.032 0.036 −0.540 0.714 0.714 −0.540 0.208 
RM 0.026 0.029 −0.250 0.251 0.251 −0.250 0.084 
ExRet 0.006 0.006 −0.501 0.613 0.613 −0.501 0.182 
RevCons −0.002 0.024 −0.921 0.572 0.572 −0.921 0.234 
RevEPS −0.001 0.000 −0.130 0.064 0.086 −0.130 0.023 
RevRecd 0.005 0.000 −0.500 0.500 1.000 −1.000 0.171 
NFirm 9.156 8.000 1.000 33.000 33.000 1.000 6.573 
NInd 4.324 4.000 1.000 14.000 19.000 1.000 2.886 
IExp 5.964 4.000 0.000 19.000 21.000 0.000 5.522 
FExp 3.221 2.000 0.000 16.000 21.000 0.000 3.974 
BrSize 42.701 40.000 2.000 134.000 161.000 1.000 25.473 
DiscInd 492.531 514.660 165.623 627.751 627.751 121.816 97.906 
AnFollow 17.008 17.000 3.000 34.000 34.000 2.000 7.347 
DayInt 111.008 91.000 31.000 326.000 360.000 30.000 69.686 
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Panel B. Good news sample, ExRet ≥ 0 (N = 14,155) 
 Mean Median P1 P99 Max Min Std 
TPRratio 1.088 1.081 0.685 1.626 2.738 0.685 0.175 
RevTP 0.124 0.094 −0.391 0.777 0.777 −0.920 0.207 
Return 0.163 0.128 −0.133 0.714 0.714 −0.335 0.162 
RM 0.030 0.033 −0.242 0.251 0.251 −0.250 0.080 
ExRet 0.132 0.094 0.002 0.613 0.613 0.000 0.131 
RevCons 0.070 0.077 −0.715 0.572 0.572 −0.921 0.208 
RevEPS 0.001 0.000 −0.125 0.064 0.086 −0.130 0.021 
RevRecd 0.004 0.000 −0.500 0.500 1.000 −1.000 0.165 
NFirm 9.001 8.000 1.000 33.000 33.000 1.000 6.522 
NInd 4.291 4.000 1.000 14.000 19.000 1.000 2.908 
IExp 5.978 4.000 0.000 19.000 21.000 0.000 5.505 
FExp 3.265 2.000 0.000 16.000 21.000 0.000 3.976 
BrSize 43.594 40.000 2.000 134.000 161.000 1.000 25.914 
DiscInd 492.666 514.713 180.027 627.751 627.751 121.816 96.500 
AnFollow 17.019 17.000 3.000 34.000 34.000 2.000 7.331 
DayInt 109.230 89.000 31.000 323.000 360.000 30.000 68.633 
 
 
Panel C. Bad news sample, Exret < 0 (N = 13,133) 
 Mean Median P1 P99 Max Min Std 
TPRratio 1.154 1.111 0.685 2.180 2.738 0.685 0.259 
RevTP −0.105 −0.064 −0.920 0.377 0.777 −0.920 0.230 
Return −0.110 −0.078 −0.540 0.171 0.552 −0.540 0.153 
RM 0.021 0.024 −0.250 0.251 0.251 −0.250 0.087 
ExRet −0.131 −0.094 −0.501 −0.002 0.000 −0.501 0.120 
RevCons −0.079 −0.037 −0.921 0.408 0.572 −0.921 0.235 
RevEPS −0.004 0.000 −0.130 0.062 0.086 −0.130 0.024 
RevRecd 0.006 0.000 −0.500 0.500 1.000 −1.000 0.177 
NFirm 9.323 8.000 1.000 33.000 33.000 1.000 6.624 
NInd 4.360 4.000 1.000 14.000 19.000 1.000 2.861 
  38
IExp 5.949 4.000 0.000 19.000 21.000 0.000 5.540 
FExp 3.172 2.000 0.000 16.000 21.000 0.000 3.971 
BrSize 41.737 38.000 2.000 125.000 161.000 1.000 24.955 
DiscInd 492.386 514.661 133.099 627.318 627.751 121.815 99.403 
AnFollow 16.998 17.000 3.000 34.000 34.000 2.000 7.365 




Panel D. Mean comparison between bad and good news subsamples 
 
 Good Bad Bad − Good p-value 
TPRratio 1.088 1.154 0.065*** 0.000 
RevTP 0.124 −0.105 −0.228*** 0.000 
Return 0.163 −0.110 −0.273*** 0.000 
RM 0.030 0.021 −0.009*** 0.000 
ExRet 0.132 −0.131 −0.264*** 0.000 
RevCons 0.070 −0.079 −0.150*** 0.000 
RevEPS 0.001 −0.004 −0.005*** 0.000 
RevRecd 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.240 
NFirm 9.001 9.323 0.322*** 0.000 
NInd 4.291 4.360 0.069** 0.048 
IExp 5.978 5.949 −0.028 0.670 
FExp 3.265 3.172 −0.093* 0.054 
BrSize 43.594 41.737 −1.857*** 0.000 
DiscInd 492.666 492.386 −0.280 0.813 
AnFollow 17.019 16.998 −0.021 0.811 
DayInt 109.230 112.924 3.694*** 0.000 
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Table 3. Pearson correlations of selected variables 
This table reports Pearson correlations between selected variables. RevTP is the target price revision; RM is market return; ExRet is excess stock 
return; RevCons is consensus target price revisions of other analysts; RevEPS is earnings forecast revision; RevRecd is recommendation revision; 
BadExRet is an indicator of firm-specific bad news (ExRet < 0); DiscInd is the disclosure index; AnFollow is analyst coverage; DayInt is the days 
between consecutive forecasts; NFirm is the number of firms covered by the analyst of interest; NInd is the number of industries covered by the 
analyst of interest; IExp is analyst industry experience; FExp is analyst firm experience; and BrSize is brokerage firm size. Appendix 1 gives a 
detailed explanation of the variables. An asterisk (*) denotes significance at 5 percent.  
 
 






DayInt NFirm NInd IExp FExp 
RM 0.302*              
ExRet 0.632* 0.091*             
RevCons 0.521* 0.227* 0.432*            
RevEPS 0.300* 0.035* 0.195* 0.259*           
RevRecd 0.216* −0.023* −0.008 0.004 0.046*          
BadExRet −0.452* −0.058* −0.722* −0.318* −0.149* 0.012*         
DiscInd 0.016* −0.020* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012* −0.004        
AnFollow −0.006 −0.023* −0.011* 0.020* 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.442*       
DayInt 0.008* 0.173* −0.020* 0.040* 0.033* −0.009 0.023* −0.042* −0.059*      
NFirm −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.008 −0.020* −0.001 0.006 −0.134* −0.191* 0.008*     
NInd 0.013* −0.005 0.013* −0.006 −0.022* 0.004 −0.010* −0.132* −0.260* 0.039* 0.456*    
IExp 0.017* 0.004 0.012* 0.018* 0.000 0.000 −0.015* 0.107* 0.126* 0.045* 0.019* 0.160*   
FExp 0.026* 0.011* 0.021* 0.038* 0.019* 0.001 −0.026* 0.150* 0.217* 0.045* −0.035* 0.084* 0.635*  
BrSize 0.024* −0.001 0.023* 0.020* 0.034* −0.009 −0.031* 0.072* 0.049* −0.078* −0.213* −0.208* −0.033* 0.016* 
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Table 4. Analysts’ use of information when revising target prices 
The table shows the results of a regression of target price revisions on market returns 
(column 1), excess stock returns (column 2), and other analysts’ target price revisions 
(column 3). Column (4) reports the results of estimating model (1). RevTP is the target 
price revision; RM is market return; ExRet is excess stock return; RevCons is consensus 
target price revisions of other analysts; RevEPS is earnings forecast revision; RevRecd is 
recommendation revision; NFirm is the number of firms covered by the analyst of 
interest; NInd is the number of industries covered by the analyst of interest; IExp is 
analyst’s industry experience; FExp is analyst’ firm experience; and BrSize is brokerage 
firm size. Appendix 1 gives a detailed explanation of the variables. All coefficients are 
estimated controlling for broker, industry, and year fixed effects; all regressions include 
a constant (unreported); reported t-statistics use cluster-robust standard errors with two-




RevTP 1 2 3 4 5 
RM     0.992*** 
(10.11) 
















RevEPS     1.004*** 
(11.79) 
RevRecd     0.324*** 
(20.61) 
FExp     0.001 
(1.63) 
IExp     −0.000 
(−0.25) 
NFirm     0.000 
(0.07) 
NInd     0.000 
(0.32) 
BrSize     −0.001 
(−0.96) 
Broker FE No No No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared 0.099 0.418 0.229 0.519 0.582 
N 27,288 27,288 27,288 27,288 27,288 
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Table 5. Analysts’ asymmetric reaction to bad and good news 
The table shows the results of estimating model (3). Column (1) includes analyst 
characteristics control variables, while columns (2) and (3) also include earnings forecast 
revisions and alternative specifications of recommendation revisions. Panel A report the 
results of estimating versions of model (3) while Panel B reports the results of estimating 
the complete model (3) and re-estimating the model without ExRet and BadExret×ExRet. 
RevTP is the target price revision; RM is market return; ExRet is excess stock return; 
RevCons is consensus target price revisions of other analysts; BadExret is an indicator of 
firm-specific bad news (ExRet < 0); RevEPS is earnings forecast revision; RevRecd is 
recommendation revision; Upgrade equals 1 if RevRecd > 0, 0 otherwise; Dngrade equals 
1 if RevRecd < 0, 0 otherwise; Reit equals 1 if analysts issue recommendations on the 
previous and current target price forecast dates, but the recommendation does not change; 
FExp is analyst firm experience; IExp is analyst industry experience; NFirm is the number 
of firms the analyst covers; NInd is the number of industries the analyst covers; and BrSize 
is brokerage firm size. Appendix 1 gives a detailed explanation of all the variables. All 
coefficients are estimated controlling for broker, industry, and year fixed effects; all 
regressions include a constant (unreported); reported t-statistics use cluster-robust 
standard errors with two-way firm–year clustering; *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent. 
 
Panel A 
RevTP 1 2 3 
RM 0.582*** 0.600*** 0.599*** 
 (7.74) (8.16) (8.12) 
ExRet 0.652*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 
 (34.27) (38.50) (37.91) 
RevCons 0.198*** 0.187*** 0.184*** 
 (11.38) (13.68) (13.45) 
BadExRet 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (2.37) (1.85) (1.77) 
BadExRet × RM −0.010 0.001 0.008 
 (−0.302) (0.024) (0.307) 
BadExRet × ExRet 0.242*** 0.158*** 0.173*** 
 (17.46) (31.19) (18.78) 
BadExRet × RevCons −0.013 −0.017 −0.017 
 (−0.85) (−1.36) (−1.46) 
RevEPS  0.991*** 1.012*** 
  (10.79) (11.19) 
RevRecd  0.323***  
  (16.29)  
BadExRet × RevEPS  −0.084 −0.073 
  (−0.69) (−0.67) 
BadExRet × RevRecd  0.000  
  (0.01)  
Upgrade   0.016*** 
   (12.30) 
Dngrade   −0.010*** 
   (−12.91) 
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Reit   0.001 
   (1.53) 
BadExRet × Upgrade   −0.002** 
   (−2.06) 
BadexRet × Dngrade   −0.002*** 
   (−3.72) 
BadExRet × Reit   0.002*** 
   (4.01) 
NFirm 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.37) (0.21) (0.29) 
NInd −0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (−0.11) (0.24) (0.09) 
IExp −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 
 (−0.95) (−0.22) (−0.28) 
FExp 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.18) (1.17) (1.16) 
BrSize −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (−0.90) (−1.07) (−1.19) 
Broker FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.522 0.584 0.579 
N 27,288 27,288 27,288 
    
    
    
 
Panel B 
RevTP 1 2 
RM 0.600*** 0.630*** 
 (8.16) (8.19) 
ExRet 0.674***  
 (38.50)  
RevCons 0.187*** 0.255*** 
 (13.68) (29.30) 
BadExRet 0.001* −0.017*** 
 (1.85) (−18.98) 
BadExRet × RM 0.001 −0.034 
 (0.02) (−0.542) 
BadExRet × ExRet 0.158***  
 (31.19)  
BadExRet × RevCons −0.017 0.085*** 
 (−1.36) (5.22) 
RevEps 0.991*** 0.561*** 
 (10.79) (2.62) 
RevRecd 0.323*** 0.320*** 
 (16.29) (13.94) 
BadExRet × RevEps −0.084 1.097*** 
 (−0.69) (5.72) 
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BadExRet × RevRecd 0.000 0.017 
 (0.01) (0.85) 
NFirm 0.000 0.000 
 (0.21) (0.34) 
NInd 0.000 0.000 
 (0.24) (0.22) 
IExp −0.001 0.000 
 (−0.22) (0.01) 
FExp 0.000 0.000* 
 (1.17) (1.78) 
BrSize −0.000 −0.000 
 (−1.07) (−0.06) 
Broker FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.584 0.462 
N 27,288 27,288 
  44
 
Table 6. Withholding bad news and the asymmetric reaction to bad and good news: subsamples ranked by disclosure quality 
The table shows the OLS estimation of model (3) on five quintiles based on firms’ disclosure index. Each year, we rank observations into quintiles 
based on firms’ disclosure index (DiscInd) values in ascending order. The top quintile includes target price revisions for firms with the highest 
DiscInd (column 5) and the bottom quintile contains revisions for firms with the lowest DiscInd (column 1). RevTP is the target price revision; 
RM is market return; ExRet is excess stock return; RevCons is consensus target price revision of other analysts; BadExRet is an indicator of firm-
specific bad news (ExRet < 0); RevEPS is the earnings forecast revision, RevRecd is the recommendation revision; FExp is analyst firm experience; 
IExp is analyst industry experience; NFirm is the number of firms the analyst covers; NInd is the number of industries the analyst covers; and 
BrSize is brokerage firm size.  All coefficients are estimated controlling for broker, industry, and year fixed effects; all regressions include a 
constant (unreported); reported t-statistics use cluster-robust standard errors with two-way firm–year clustering; *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10, 5, and 1 percent. 
 
RevTP Rank 
DiscInd = 1 
Rank 
DiscInd = 2 
Rank 
DiscInd = 3 
Rank 
DiscInd = 4 
Rank 
DiscInd = 5 
RM 0.509*** 0.578*** 0.577*** 0.604*** 0.678*** 
 (6.68) (9.64) (6.69) (7.20) (7.70) 
ExRet 0.649*** 0.603*** 0.704*** 0.686*** 0.675*** 
 (10.71) (10.48) (27.29) (13.60) (29.94) 
RevCons 0.168*** 0.204*** 0.169*** 0.206*** 0.163*** 
 (3.64) (5.84) (5.02) (5.69) (6.35) 
BadExRet 0.001 0.002 0.002*** 0.001 −0.001 
 (0.62) (1.50) (2.58) (1.09) (−0.67) 
BadExRet × RM 0.053 0.017 0.008 −0.008 0.005 
 (0.86) (0.39) (0.16) (−0.15) (0.06) 
BadExRet × Exret 0.228*** 0.327*** 0.136*** 0.104 0.046 
 (3.09) (7.38) (3.23) (1.22) (0.87) 
BadExRet × RevCons 0.009 −0.039 −0.018 −0.056 0.030 
 (0.17) (−1.34) (−0.39) (−1.49) (0.69) 
RevEPS 1.196*** 1.402** 0.981*** 1.003*** 0.659*** 
 (3.97) (2.40) (4.33) (5.57) (6.02) 
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RevRecd 0.337*** 0.279*** 0.342*** 0.365*** 0.286*** 
 (12.46) (18.01) (9.55) (9.86) (7.49) 
BadExRet × RevEPS −0.325 −0.514 0.221 −0.015 0.012 
 (−1.121) (−0.801) (0.821) (−0.058) (0.001) 
BadExRet × RevRecd −0.004 0.045* −0.025 −0.051 0.045** 
 (−0.107) (1.78) (−0.58) (−1.50) (2.81) 
FExp −0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (−0.99) (1.69) (0.33) (0.92) (0.34) 
IExp 0.001** −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 
 (2.45) (−0.90) (−1.28) (−0.67) (0.10) 
NFirm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 
 (1.06) (0.01) (0.77) (0.86) (−0.97) 
NInd −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 
 (−0.74) (1.22) (−0.05) (−1.29) (1.05) 
BrSize 0.000 −0.001* 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (0.79) (−1.80) (0.82) (−0.22) (−0.93) 
Broker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.589 0.601 0.605 0.596 0.579 




Table 7. Withholding bad news and the asymmetric reaction to bad and good news: subsamples ranked by analyst following 
The table shows the OLS estimation of model (3) on five quintiles based on firms’ analyst following. Each year, we rank observations into quintiles 
based on analyst following (AnFollow) in ascending order. The top quintile includes target price revisions for firms with the highest AnFollow 
(column 5) and the bottom quintile contains revisions for firms with the lowest AnFollow (column 1). RevTP is the target price revision; RM is 
market return; ExRet is excess stock return; RevCons is consensus target price revision of other analysts; BadExRet is an indicator of firm-specific 
bad news (ExRet < 0); RevEPS is the earnings forecast revision, RevRecd is the recommendation revision; FExp is analyst firm experience; IExp 
is analyst industry experience; NFirm is the number of firms the analyst covers; NInd is the number of industries the analyst covers; and BrSize is 
brokerage firm size.  All coefficients are estimated controlling for broker, industry, and year fixed effects; all regressions include a constant 
(unreported); reported t-statistics use cluster-robust standard errors with two-way firm–year clustering; *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 
5, and 1 percent. 
 
RevTP Rank 
AnFollow = 1 
Rank 
AnFollow = 2 
Rank 
AnFollow = 3 
Rank 
AnFollow = 4 
Rank 
AnFollow = 5 
RM 0.632*** 0.573*** 0.712*** 0.519*** 0.576*** 
 (5.82) (8.59) (6.55) (8.23) (8.60) 
ExRet 0.692*** 0.709*** 0.661*** 0.651*** 0.596*** 
 (26.82) (19.09) (42.22) (12.21) (8.37) 
RevCons 0.150*** 0.131*** 0.213*** 0.245*** 0.201*** 
 (6.62) (6.03) (8.17) (11.77) (12.72) 
BadExRet 0.001* 0.002 0.001*** 0.001 −0.001 
 (1.75) (1.58) (30.39) (0.96) (−0.40) 
BadExRet × RM 0.006 0.031 −0.127** 0.058 0.036 
 (0.05) (0.02) (−2.11) (1.33) (0.63) 
BadExRet × Exret 0.239*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.128 0.047 
 (5.34) (5.71) (6.17) (1.56) (0.59) 
BadExRet × RevCons −0.020 0.020 −0.058*** −0.067** 0.098*** 
 (−0.59) (0.59) (−4.34) (−1.99) (2.89) 
RevEPS 1.648*** 1.031*** 0.829*** 0.690*** 1.160*** 
 (3.61) (5.88) (6.68) (3.86) (3.88) 
RevRecd 0.323*** 0.343*** 0.334*** 0.338*** 0.252*** 
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 (6.92) (14.91) (8.44) (16.27) (9.15) 
BadExRet × RevEPS −0.298 −0.309 −0.328 0.285 −0.095 
 (−0.61) (−1.40) (−0.93) (1.05) (−0.25) 
BadExRet × RevRecd 0.029 0.004 −0.035 −0.006 0.019 
 (1.05) (0.15) (−0.95) (−0.29) (1.44) 
FExp −0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.001 −0.000 
 (−0.43) (2.48) (0.14) (1.33) (−0.47) 
IExp 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000* −0.000 
 (0.48) (−0.76) (0.99) (−1.80) (−0.70) 
NFirm 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 
 (0.86) (−0.45) (0.17) (1.22) (−0.54) 
NInd −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000*** 
 (−0.39) (0.22) (−1.088) (−0.248) (2.12) 
BrSize 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (1.24) (0.61) (−0.35) (−1.02) (−1.24) 
Broker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.623 0.609 0.584 0.598 0.539 
 N  3,232  5,632  5,847  6,716  5,861 
 
 
